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RECENT GASES

in view of the diminishing proportional importance of the general
property tax. In refusing to accept the reasoning followed by these
other courts, the Kentucky court has refused to accept a judicial
device, the extended special fund theory, which has enabled these
other courts to lend approval to legislative schemes designed to circumvent similar constitutional limitations. There can be little doubt
that the court has construed the constitutional debt prohibitions substantially as the original framers of these provisions in 1849 intended
them to be understood. 25 The hardship which this decision works on
the highway program of the Commonwealth is not the result of an
erroneous construction placed upon the Constitution by the Court of
Appeals, but is rather attributable to the lack of foresight exercised
by the framers of our fundamental law.26 The decision properly leaves
to the people of the state the task of revising the Constitution to meet
the needs of the Commonwealth as they themselves feel those needs
exist.
GIBSON DOWNING
CoN-rAcrs-BAmin.NT-EFFEcr OF PROvisIONs LnmTING
PRNTED ON PARKING LOT IDENTIFICATION RECEnr-Plaintiff

LiABmrr

parked his

car overnight in the Parkrite Auto Park in Lexington, Kentucky. He
was handed what was apparently a receipt or identification stub upon
the back of which was the following limitation of the bailee's liability:
See generally

REPORT OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION

FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONS~rrUTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY (1949).

See. 49 of the present Constitution was adopted in toto from the Kentucky Constitution of 1849.
"'-Even in 1849 some Kentuckians realized that restrictions such as those

found in Sections 49 and 50 would become obnoxious to the Commonwealth. In
arguing against the adoption of See. 35 of Article Second of the Kentucky Constitution of 1849, which eventually became See. 49 of the present Constitution,
William Preston, Constitutional Convention Delegate from the City of Louisville
said:

".

.

. There are a hundred reasons why this margin [the $500,000. limit]

should be left with the legislature; and I hope that no personal differences of
opinion, no little spirit of parsimony will prevail on this floor, on such a subject as
this. I hope by our vote on this question we will at least say that the people of
the [C]ommonwealth of Kentucky can afford to repose discretion in their legislature, to redeem the honor of their state, as its emergencies might require. Impose
this restriction, and you will find that in five or six years an impulse will have
sprung up under the influence of wealth and growing prosperity that will call for
another constitution.
"... A constitution, sir, is a thing that should be made for ages, if made as
it ought to be. It is the embodiment of the great principles lying at the foundation
of society, which should be disturbed as seldom as possible. . . . I merely ask
gentlemen to use some discretion; I ask them not to stigmatize the state by saying
that they have no power in all time to come; I ask them not to deprive the state
of that self-control which belongs to all truly and well organized bodies." REPORT
OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF T=E CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF TE
CONSTITrrTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY, 1849 at 782-783.
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In consideration of the low rates charged for parking,
customer agrees that parking operator will not be responsible for loss
by fire, misdelivery or theft except such loss be occasioned by negligence of operator, and then only up to a maximum value of $100.
Proportionally greater rates must be paid in advance if
customer sets larger limits of liability.
Articles left in car at owner's risk. 1

According to the plaintiff's uncontradicted testimony his attention
was not called to the limitation of liability and he had no notice of it.
During the night the car was stolen through the defendant's negligence
and upon suit in the Fayette Circuit Court the plaintiff recovered

$792.95. On appeal the defendant insisted that the entire contract of
bailment was printed upon the receipt and its liability was thus limited

to $100.00. Held: Judgment affirmed. Parkrite Auto Park v. Badgett,
242 S.W. 2d 630, (Ky. 1951).

Cases in the United States passing upon the question presented
in the principal case fall into three distinct categories. In at least one
state it has been held that printed stipulations on a parking stub given
by a parking lot operator which limit the operator's liability will

effectively absolve him from liability, such stipulation being part of
the bailment contract and binding upon the bailor.2 In so holding, the
appellate court of California drew an analogy to cases where bills of

lading and receipts given by warehouses contain terms and conditions
which are considered binding regardless of the ignorance of the acceptor as to their contents.3 The court said:
....
Defendant admits that nothing was said or done, beyond the
mere fact of handing him the piece of cardboard, to direct Lejeune's
attention to such printed matter or any portion thereof...
Upon the above-mentioned evidence we cannot say
as a matter of law that the trial court was unjustified in its implied
finding that by the contract of bailment it was agreed (impliedly)
that defendant's responsibility4 as bailee should cease upon the closing of its park at 12 midnight.

The above holding has been criticized by one legal scholar as "impracticable and conducive to fraud."5
Another view adopted by courts when considering provisions of

the sort encountered in the principal case is that which is exemplified
by Ohio decisions. In Pallotto v. HannaParkingGarage Co.,0 the court
'Parkrite
Auto Park v. Badgett, 242 S.W. 2d 680, 682 (Ky. 1951).
2
U Drive & Tour v. System Auto Parks, 28 Cal. App. 2d 782, 71 Pac. 2d
854 (1987).
3
WILLISTON, CoNmrAcrs, sec. 90A (1988).
"Supra, note 2, 71 Pac. 2d 854, 857.
5
Jones, The Parking Lot Cases, 27 GEoRGcro-w L.J. 162, 179 (1938-89).
846 Ohio
L. Abs. 18, 68 N.E. 2d 170 (1946).
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said that contracts limiting liability for negligence in bailments for
hire, in the course of dealing with the public, have generally been
regarded as against public policy.7 From a purely theoretical and historical approach this holding seems to be valid. However, when reflection is made on the fact that a bailee, in the usual parking lot
situation, is undertaking to care for an object valued, at from two
thousand to six thousand dollars for a consideration of twenty-five
cents to one dollar, the above holding loses some of its appeal. There
seems to be no reason why a parking lot operator should not be able
to limit his liability in proportion to the rates he charges on the condition that the customer-bailor has actual knowledge of the limitation.
For this reason it is the opinion of this writer that the rule adopted
by the majority of jurisdictions is correct. This rule is stated as follows:
Similiarly, although there is authority apparently to the
contrary, the trend of the more recent authorities is toward the view
that receipt from a garage keeper of the numbered identification
slip for an automobile left at a garage or parking station does not
bind the bailor as to provisions, purportedly limiting the bailee's
liability, which are printed thereon, where his attention is not called
to them and he has no actual knowledge at the time of the bailment
that they are supposed to become part of the contract.8

This view is supported by many cases in the United States. 9 In
Kravitz v. Parking Service Co.,10 the court said that provisions on the
parking stub disclaiming liability for loss or damage did not bind the
bailor unless they were brought to his attention or known to him,
'Malone v. Santora, 135 Conn. 286, 64 A. 2d 51, 54 (1949); Lee Tire &
Rubber Co. of the State of N.Y. v. Dormer, 108 A. 2d 168, 172 (Del. 1954) Dictum; Jersey Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Syndicate Parking 78 N.E. 2d 692, 693 (Ohio
1948); Agricultural Insurance Co. v. Constantine, 58 N.E. 2d 658 (Ohio App.
1944); Ais
v. Racquet Garage Corp., 177 Pa. Super. 94, 110 A. 2d 767, 768
(1955). k
V

24 AM. Jun. 496.

'Kravitz v. Parking Service Co., 199 So. 727, 729 (Ala. 1940); Manning v.
Lamb, 89 A. 2d 882, 884 (D. C. Mun. App. 1952); Lucas v. Auto City Parking
Co., 62 A. 2d 557, 560 (D. C. Mun. App. 1948); Parlaite Auto Park v. Badgett,
supra note 1; Munson v. Blaise, 12 So. 2d 623, 624 (La. 1943); Rappaport v.
Storfer Bros. 138 N.Y.S. 2d 584, 588 (1955) (Fur coat); Howard v. Handler
Bros. & Winell, 103 N.Y.S. 2d 786, 789-791 (1951) (Fur coat); Marrone v.
McGraw-Hill Bldg. Corp., 70 N.Y.S. 2d 16 (1947) per curiam. It is interesting
to note that the law relating to the liability of bailees and provisions limiting their
liability seems to historically follow a definite pattern of development in any given
particular situation. For instance, in carrier cases concerning bills of lading the
early cases held that provisions limiting liability were against public policy. The
next series of cases held the provisions binding with notice to the bailor. When
it became uniform practice to limit liability and thus became well-known to the
public, the cases hold the provisions binding without notice. The parking lot
cases, being comparatively modem, may be evolving in the same manner, thus
explaining the three way split of authority as to the effect of these provisions.
9 AM. Jum. 879; Howardv. Handler Bros. & Winell Inc., supra this note.
" Supra note 9.
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thereby making such provisions a part of the terms of the baiment
contract. However, in cases where the facts have established that the
bailor had notice of the provisions limiting the liability of the bailee
the courts have had little difficulty in finding that the provisions became part of the bailment contract."
In the principal case the Kentucky Court of Appeals undoubtedly
reached the right result. However, as a basis for reaching this result
they gave two apparently conflicting reasons. Early in the opinion
the court quoted the above excerpt from American Jurisprudence,
and said, in effect, that the provisions on the parking receipt would
have been binding upon the plaintiff if his attention had been called
to them. However, according to the plaintiff's "uncontradicted testimony" his attention had not been called to them at the time of the
bailment. Thus the contract between bailor and bailee limiting the
bailee's liability was never completed because the provision was never
assented to, either impliedly or otherwise. If the court had rested
with this ground for its result there would have been no difficulty
created by the decision. '
In an attempt, however, to bolster its decision by providing another
basis the court then considered Denver Union Terminal Railway Co.
v. Cullinan,12 a case involving a bailment of baggage. The Kentucky
court said:
It was pointed out in the Cullinan opinion that in bailments
for hire in the course of a bailee's general dealing with the public,
contracts limiting liability
for negligence are generally considered
3
against public policy.'

Thus it is seen that the Kentucky court apparently bases its decision
on conflicting grounds, grounds which confront an analyzer of the case
with a difficult task of reconciliation. If provisions in contracts of bailment which limit liability for negligence are against public policy and
unenforceable, a discussion of whether or not there was an acceptance
of such a contract would seem to be immaterial to the result; whereas
if there may be such a contract when impliedly assented to by the
bailor's having knowledge or notice of the provisions and making no
objection thereto, the court would seem to have no reason to declare
such contractual provisions against public policy. In other words,
such provisions may not be capable of enforcement if accepted on the
one hand, and unenforceable because against public policy on the
other hand.
a' Marrone v. McGraw-Hill Bldg. Corp., supra note 9.
78 Colo. 248, 210 Pac. 602, 27 A.L.R. 154 (1922).
a Supra note 1, 242 S.W. 2d 630, 632.
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It is the belief of this writer that the real holding of the Parkrite
case is that there was no contract because it was not accepted, but
that it would have been enforceable if assented to. First, the facts of
the case show that the bailor-plaintiff did not assent to the contractual
condition. Thus the court had no contract to declare against public
policy. Second, the statement concerning public policy follows the
statement relating to contractual assent. This would seem to indicate
that the court merely added the statement of public policy as an afterthought-as an additional supporting leg. Third, the court makes particular note of the exact statement in American Jurisprudence, 14 that
the trend of more recent decisions is to hold these provisions binding
if assented to, thus implying that the intention of the court is to follow the majority rule and enforce these provisions if acceptance is
proven. It is the belief of this writer that it is also the better rule. It
is a compromise between the position of the bailor-customer and the
bailee-proprietor, allowing the bailee to limit his liability in proportion to his rates and insuring to the bailor an opportunity to know of
and assent to or reject the contractual provision limiting the balor's
liability. This position is sound in both reason and justice to both
parties.
J. MoNTjoy Tm, mLE
CRaMINAL LAW--AREST-PROBABLE

CAUSE

FoR

ARREST

Wrrno T A

WAmANT-Defendant was arrested for burglary by officers acting without a warrant on information obtained by interrogating a witness
whom they had picked up in response to a "tip" from a secret informer.
A search of the defendant's automobile revealed burglary tools which
were introduced in evidence over defendant's objection that his arrest,
and hence the search of his car, was illegal, since not based upon a
reasonable belief that he was guilty of a felony. Defendant contended
that since the witness, whose identity had been given to the police by
the informer, had not definitely accused him of any crime, the officers
had not acted reasonably in inferring that the defendant had committed a felony even though the witness's statements were almost
tantamount to an accusation. Defendant also asked the court to
require the arresting officer to divulge on the witness stand the name
of the informer who furnished the tip leading to the arrest and questioning of the witness. The trial court ruled against defendant on
both points and defendant appealed. Held, judgment affirmed.
Brewster v. Comm., 278 S.W. 2d 63 (Ky. 1955).
" Supra p. 2-3.

